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Abstract Strong policies to address climate change will almost
certainly require that large quantities of oil, natural gas, and coal
remain underground. Because these resources have economic
value, action to reduce carbon emissions means that fossil fuel
owners and producers, and other entities in the fossil fuel supply
chain, will experience a reduction in wealth. They will be on the
receiving end of what we call the BCarbon Ask.^ We compile
disparate data sources, make some simplifying assumptions, and
approximate the value of the Carbon Ask for the world as a
whole. We find that the value of the world’s fossil fuel enterprise
in a business-as-usual case, unconstrained by climate policy, is
about $295 trillion. In a world with a strong climate policy, the
value of these resources drops to about $110 trillion, a decrease
of $185 trillion, or 63 %. The Carbon Ask is equivalent to
2.4 years of global GDP. After reviewing the literature on resis-
tance to technological innovation during the past two centuries
and examining legal challenges to recent US greenhouse gas
regulations, we find it unsurprising that the Carbon Ask creates
powerful incentives for many stakeholders—who may be firms,
workers, consumers, and governments—to resist policies to
speed the development and diffusion of new, more environmen-
tally benign technologies. We also find few precedents for poli-
cy-driven, rather than market-driven, technological transforma-
tions with a scale and scope similar to decarbonization of the
global economy.
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Introduction1
Domestic politics in the United States notwithstanding, there is
generally a global consensus that climate change is an urgent
concern requiring international action. In 2015, 195 countries
adopted the Paris Agreement, a commitment to a process for
making emission reductions to hold the increase in global tem-
perature to Bwell below^ 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to
Bpursue efforts^ to hold the increase to 1.5 °C (COP21 2015,
p. 22). Fulfilling the Paris Agreement will likely require that large
quantities of oil, natural gas, and coal remain in the ground.
Because these resources have economic value, leaving them un-
derground is like taking a write-off on the world’s capital asset
balance sheet. A strong climate policy will also likely depress
demand for, and the price of, fossil fuels that are produced. In
short, action to reduce emissions means that fossil fuel owners,
and other entities in the fossil fuel supply chain, will be asked—
in a political sense—to accept a reduction in wealth. Theywill be
on the receiving end of what we call the BCarbon Ask.^
Underground fossil fuels are not just a source of value for
multinational firms and of revenue for wealthy governments.
Many actors have a stake in carbon assets: middle-class citi-
zens with retirement holdings in oil, gas, and coal securities;
developing countries with ample fossil fuel resources but low
standards of living; and impoverished Appalachian towns
1 Additional information on global fossil fuel quantities is contained in a
Technical Appendix. We would like to thank Irene Kim for her work as a
research assistant. In addition, valuable comments were provided by
Gerald Brock, Nancy Augustine, and two anonymous reviewers.
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where coal mining is the only driver of economic activity. Add
in the supply chain—manufacturers of drilling and mining
equipment; field service companies that support oil and gas
exploration and production; railroads, pipelines, and tanker
fleets that bring fossil fuels to market; and workers in all these
sectors—and the list of stakeholders gets longer. These partic-
ipants in the global fossil fuel enterpise are also on the receiv-
ing end of the Carbon Ask.
In this paper, we put a price tag on the Carbon Ask. We
compile disparate data, make simplifying assumptions, and
approximate its global value. Although our result can be fairly
called a back-of-the-envelope estimate, we find the Carbon
Ask to be so large that it is clearly relevant to climate
policymaking. In addition, after reviewing the literature on
technological innovation and examining legal challenges to
recent US greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations, we are con-
vinced that the size of the Carbon Ask helps to explain the
behavior of those who aim to impede action on climate change.
We do not question the threats posed by climate change nor
the need for prompt and effective policy (IPCC 2014). And
while it is tempting to try to tell a broader story by juxtaposing
the Carbon Ask against an estimate of the cost of global
warming, doing so is no easy task. Although 89 % of expert
climate economists believe that climate change is already neg-
atively affecting the global economy or will do so by 2050
(Howard and Sylvan 2015), the academic literature reflects a
lively debate about the size of these effects. Some economists
believe that the social cost of GHG emissions is about $20 per
ton of CO2, while others suggest that it could be as high as
$200 per ton (Pindyck 2013). Rather than engaging this de-
bate, we choose to focus more narrowly on one element of the
issue. We also recognize that by estimating the lost economic
value of fossil fuel resources, we may lend credence to argu-
ments made by advocates whose sole objective is to obstruct
climate policy. For us, however, the value of an informed
debate trumps the risk of our findings being taken out of
context.
We start by exploring the technological transformation
needed to address climate change and then put that transfor-
mation into context by reviewing similar transformations over
the past 200 years. Next, we review key concepts in the idea of
the Carbon Ask and specify the attributes of a sound approach
to estimating its magnitude. We then describe the methodolo-
gy, data, and results of our quantitative analysis. We conclude
by discussing the practical implications of our findings.
Climate policy as technology transformation
Translating a specific temperature increase goal into action-
able policy depends in part on the link between emissions and
temperature change. Because CO2 persists in the atmosphere
for decades, its impact on the climate is not especially
sensitive to when it is released. Accordingly, analysts often
talk about a budget that can be spent (in the form of ongoing
CO2 emissions) over time.
2 The IPCC reported that if post-
2011 emissions stay within a budget of 1300 gigatons (Gt),
there is a 50 % probability of holding warming to under 2 °C
(2014, p. 64). Satisfying this emission budget, while accom-
modating global population and economic growth, will re-
quire a radical transformation in how the world produces
and uses energy. Recognizing this challenge, the G-7 Heads
of State called for Bdecarbonization^ of the global economy
by 2100 (G-7 2015, p. 12). Along the way, profound techno-
logical, economic, social, and institutional obstacles must be
overcome (IPCC 2014). Or, in plain language, Byou’re fooling
yourself if you think getting off fossil fuels will be simple. It
will be one of the most difficult challengesmodern civilization
has ever faced^ (Wagner and Weitzman 2015, p. ix).
Radical technological transformations, akin to
decarbonization of the world’s economy, are not unprecedent-
ed. The Industrial Revolution, the shift from horses and sailing
ships to mechanized transport, and the rapid pace of innova-
tion in information technology are examples of what Joseph
Schumpeter called Bcreative destruction^ (Schumpeter 1943,
p. 83). For Schumpeter, two phenomena—creation and de-
struction—must occur if significant technological changes
are to diffuse throughout an economy. First, inventors and
entrepreneurs must Bcreate^ new technologies that are, in
some way, superior to existing technologies. Second, users
must abandon existing technologies (the Bdestruction^ phase)
and adopt the new technology. Scholars continue work to
understand the political economy of technological progress
(Balalaeva 2015; Acemoglu et al. 2014; Sapolsky and
Taylor 2011; Comin and Hobijn 2009; Chaudhry and Garner
2007; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; Rogers 1995; Mokyr
1992; Reinganum 1989; David 1985; Kamien and Schwartz
1982; Rosenberg 1972; Mansfield 1961).
From the narrowmicroeconomic view of a firm or consum-
er, the process of technology adoption is a matter of benefits,
costs, and uncertainty (Linquiti 2015; Hall 2005; Tassey
1997). First, the benefits of the new technology are weighed
against those of the current technology. Benefits may stem
from lower operating costs, better quality outputs, or new
features valued by users. Offsetting the benefits of a new tech-
nology are its costs, which may include acquisition and oper-
ating costs, as well as the cost of transitioning from an existing
technology to a new one. Beyond costs and benefits, potential
technology adopters consider uncertainties about costs, reli-
ability, and performance, as well as about customer and com-
petitor responses to the new technology. In this framework,
2 Meinshausen et al. appear to be among the first to use the term Bbudget^
(2009, p. 1158), while others refer to the same concept as an emissions
Bquota^ (Raupach et al. 2014, p. 873).
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new technologies are adopted when benefits exceed costs to a
degree sufficient to offset residual uncertainties.
When it comes to technological transformations with large
economic consequences, however, the standard microeco-
nomic framework is incomplete because it ignores the tenden-
cy of powerful economic interests to exert political pressure
on the policymaking process to protect incumbent technology
providers and impede technological newcomers (Acemoglu
et al. 2014; Hirth and Uekerdt 2013; Sapolsky and Taylor
2011). Shifting the focus from microeconomics to the broader
field of political economy, we find ample evidence of the
ability of vested interests to affect the trajectory of technolog-
ical progress. For example, having studied resistance to new
technologies in Britain and France during the Industrial
Revolution, Mokyr concludes that
Writing economic history as if there were no political
history is unacceptable.… Resistance to progress, when
it came from a well-organized lobby of potential losers,
served the narrow interests of a small and selfish group
at the expense of the social good. … In the historical
experience the irrelevancy of such [neoclassical eco-
nomic] models is apparent; the friction caused by tech-
nological shocks is an inescapable part of the story be-
cause technological change not only expanded the sup-
ply of resources, it involved their transfer from the status
quo to newcomers (1992, pp. 326, 328–329).
More recently, Comin and Hobijn reviewed the diffusion of
20 transformative technologies over 215 years in 23 of the
world’s major economies in fields like steel-making, commu-
nication, and transportation (2009). In cases where a new
technology had a competing predecessor technology (imply-
ing a vested interest threatened by the innovation), the power
of lobbies was used to Bsignificantly slow the speed of diffu-
sion of new technologies^ (p. 242). The effect was not
observed when there was no competing predecessor
technology. Balalaeva examined patent data from 100
countries over 20 years and found that countries with
governance structures that allow technology innovators
open access to political power, in turn, experience
higher levels of technological progress. Conversely, if
technology incumbents can block access to political
power by newcomers, then national rates of innovation
suffer appreciably (Balalaeva 2015).
Prior analyses relevant tomeasuring the CarbonAsk
McKibben drew popular attention to underground carbon in a
Rolling Stone article that linked a 2 °C temperature target first
to a carbon budget and then to an estimate of subsurface fossil
fuels and concluded that 80 % of fossil fuel reserves should
remain underground (2012). In the same vein, but taking a
more rigorous approach, McGlade and Ekins assessed the
quantity, location, and production cost of global fossil fuel
resources (2015). They then applied a cost minimization algo-
rithm to determine that Bglobally, a third of oil reserves, half of
gas reserves and over 80 percent of current coal reserves
should remain unused from 2010 to 2050 in order to meet
the target of 2°C^ (p. 187).
The Capital Institute identified a Bstranded asset risk^
that might lead firms and governments to abandon $20
trillion in fossil fuel reserves (Fullerton 2011). That anal-
ysis suggests that the world’s 100 largest publicly listed
coal mining companies and the 100 largest publicly
listed oil and gas extraction companies have a market
capitalization of $7 trillion. Fullerton claims that these
firms own 26 % of the world’s fossil fuel reserves.
Assuming that markets would value government- and
privately-held reserves as they do reserves owned by
publicly listed firms, and that such firms are valued sole-
ly as a function of proved reserves, he scales the firm
valuations to a value of $27 trillion for global reserves.
Finally, he applies a carbon budget constraint that no
more than 20 % of fossil fuel reserves can be burned,
yielding an estimated $20 trillion in stranded assets.
A 2013 Carbon Tracker Initiative (CTI) report suggested
that 60 to 80 % of publicly traded firms’ oil, gas, and coal
reserves cannot be used under a 2 °C scenario (Leaton et al.
2013). In 2012, these firms spent $674 billion to find and
develop new reserves, an investment characterized as Bwasted
capital.^ In a more recent analysis, CTI estimated the reduc-
tion in capital spending for oil, gas, and coal exploration and
development (from 2015 to 2025) that would result from pol-
icies to hold warming to 2 °C—in contrast to a business-as-
usual case—at $2 trillion (Fulton et al. 2015). In both analy-
ses, CTI calls on investors and regulators to ensure that mar-
kets better account for climate policies in firm valuations and
capital allocations. CTI argues that rather than investing in
exploration and development, fossil fuel firms should return
funds to shareholders through dividends and share buybacks.
On the other hand, Heede and Oreskes conclude that the vast
majority of proved reserves are not owned by private actors
but by governments around the world (2016). Neither Heede
and Oreskes nor CTI monetize the value of subsurface
resources.
Bauer et al. estimated the present value of the change in
fossil fuel rents from 2010 to 2100 that would result from a
policy to hold CO2 concentrations to 450 ppm, roughly cor-
responding to warming of 2 °C (2013). Rents, also called
profits by the authors, are defined as the difference between
price and production plus transportation cost. The authors re-
port that climate policy would decrease the present value of
fossil fuel rents from $29.9 trillion to $17.5 trillion, a differ-
ence of $12.4 trillion.
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Investment banking firm Kepler Cheuvreux investigated
the effect of climate policy on revenues of oil, gas, and coal
producers (Lewis 2014). Its report relies on work done by the
International Energy Agency (IEA) which projected the pro-
duction and pricing of fossil fuels under alternative policy
scenarios between 2013 and 2035. Lewis compares a base
case where some modest climate initiatives occur to a policy
case where aggressive action is taken to hold warming to
within 2 °C. Annual revenues are computed, as price times
quantity, over the 23-year analysis period for both the base and
policy cases, and then summed without being discounted.
Results suggest that climate policy would reduce revenues
by $28.3 trillion.
In 2014, the Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) reported
on the lost asset values associated with policies to limit
warming to 2 °C (Nelson et al. 2014). Like Lewis, CPI
used two IEA scenarios to characterize the policy envi-
ronment for fossil fuels, but while the policy case is the
same, the base case differs. CPI used an IEA business-
as-usual scenario that includes no policy changes as its
base case, while Lewis used as his base case an IEA
scenario that assumes implementation of some climate
policies currently under development. While it relied
on IEA’s scenarios to predict fossil fuel demand, CPI
used its own supply cost models for oil, natural gas,
coal, and electric power markets around the world to
predict the supply response to the IEA demand esti-
mates. The analysis is done for each year between
2015 and 2035, and lost profits are discounted at 8 %.
The result is a decrease in profits of $24.6 trillion,
which the authors characterize as Bvalue at risk.^
Finally, a Citigroup report estimates that global climate
policy would result in the stranding of fossil fuel resources
worth just over $100 trillion (Channell et al. 2015). This esti-
mate applies current market prices of oil, gas, and coal3 to the
quantities of unburnable reserves estimated by McGlade and
Ekins. This approach has the effect of using a discount rate of
zero, applying 40-year analytic time frame running from 2010
to 2050, and valuing only reserves rather the more expansive
category of resources.
Methodology
Attributes of a sound method to estimate the Carbon Ask
A credible estimate of the Carbon Ask requires several impor-
tant analytic components. First, it should consider all fossil
fuel resources, not just reserves. Reserves represent resource
quantities, the existence of which has been confirmed by site-
specific geologic investigations and for which extraction is
technologically feasible, permitted by law, and commercial-
ly profitable at current prices. Resources, on the other hand,
refer to the total quantity of fossil fuels that remain beneath
the earth’s surface. (Reserves are a subset of resources.)
Some resources cannot be recovered with today’s technol-
ogies; no matter how much money someone is willing to
spend, they cannot extract the resource. After excluding
unrecoverable resources, the result is technically recover-
able resources.
Reserves are continually replenished as fossil fuels move
out of the category of resources, into the narrower category
of reserves, and then into production. For example, global
reserves of oil grew from 643 billion barrels in 1980 to
1656 billion barrels in 2014, while natural gas reserves
went from 2592 to 6973 trillion ft3 (EIA 2014b). For three
decades, the ratio of oil reserves to oil production in the
USA has oscillated between 9 and 14 years (EIA 2014c).
The fact that reserves have increased over time and that the
reserves-to-production ratio has not trended downward, is
evidence that reserves are not an appropriate measure of a
shrinking non-renewable resource. In addition, leaving non-
reserve resources out of the Carbon Ask assigns these re-
sources zero value. But because these resources are the
source, first of reserves and then of production, they are
clearly valuable. Shifting the focus from reserves to techni-
cally recoverable resources also has profound implications
for the size of Carbon Ask because we estimate that - at a
minimum - oil and natural gas resources exceed reserves by
a factor of, respectively, 2.9 and 2.4.
Second, the estimation of the Carbon Ask should not be
constrained by an unduly short time frame. Fossil fuel pro-
duction is certain to continue for decades, perhaps centuries.
Even though the time value of money (i.e., the discounting
process) means that fossil fuel production in the future has
less value than today, expected revenues from future produc-
tion nonetheless contribute to today’s resource values.
Because fossil fuels are a finite resource, however, the anal-
ysis ought to constrain production quantities to total under-
ground technically recoverable resources. In addition, be-
cause not all fossil fuels are used for energy production
(e.g., oil is used as a feedstock by the chemical industry),
this constraint also needs to reflect that some underground
resources will go to non-energy uses, irrespective of climate
policy.
Third, the estimated Carbon Ask should reflect the fact that
intrinsic differences among fossil fuels in their carbon content
and production costs will drive the mix of fuels used in a
carbon-constrained world. For example, using natural gas to
generate 1 kW h of electricity releases 1.21 lb of CO2 while
the use of coal releases around 2.13 lb (EIA 2015c).
Production costs also vary widely. The typical production cost
for conventional, onshore oil in the Middle East is about $27
per barrel but about $65 a barrel for unconventional North3 $70 per barrel of oil, $6.50 per million BTU, and $70 per ton of coal.
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American shale fields (Weissmann 2014).4 Given differ-
ences in emission rates and production costs, rather than
an across-the-board cut in all fossil fuel use, compliance
with climate policy will resemble a least-cost optimiza-
tion in which markets allocate the emission reductions
across all fuel types and across the geographic locations
of individual fuel types.5
Finally, instead of focusing only on the profits of fossil fuel
producers (i.e., price minus cost, times quantity), a more com-
plete measure of the Carbon Ask would assess total revenue
(i.e., price times quantity). Revenue is a superior measure to
profits for our purposes because it better approximates the
impact of the Carbon Ask upstream in the supply chain (i.e.,
as experienced by asset owners, equipment suppliers, service
companies, and workers in the fossil fuel industry).6 In the
standard microeconomic framework, the supply-side impacts
of policy actions are typically assessed only by a change in
what economists call Bproducer surplus^ which in this case
would be the difference between the price of, say, a barrel of
oil (inclusive of a premium, or rent, arising from its non-
renewable nature) and the marginal cost of producing it.
Implicit in the standard model is the assumption that the cap-
ital and labor resources displaced by government policy
would be re-deployed to other productive uses and thus do
not constitute a true cost to society.
For this analysis, however, we look at the world’s fossil
fuel enterprise not through the lens of traditional microeco-
nomics but through the broader lens of political economy. We
aim to explain political resistance to climate policy, to dis-
placement of industry incumbents, and to diffusion of new
climate-friendly technologies. The question here is thus
whether such resistance arises only when stakeholders face a
threat to their ability to earn rents and producer surplus or,
alternatively, when any aspect of their economic interests are
threatened. We believe the latter case to be true. It seems self-
evident that it is of only minimal comfort to workers who may
lose their jobs and to corporate executives and owners facing
significant decreases in their business to know that their re-
sources would be productively re-deployed elsewhere in a
post-policy world. Their propensity to politically resist policy
change would seem to be driven primarily by the pain of
short-term economic displacement and the risk that their per-
sonal well-being could be lower in a post-policy world.
Quantifying the Carbon Ask
The monetary value of the Carbon Ask (A) is defined as,
A ¼ VBAU− V2 -C ð1Þ
where VBAU is the value of total existing subsurface fossil fuel
resources recoverable with current technology (i.e., business
as usual) and V2 °C is the value of only those resources that can
be extracted and burned without exceeding the 2 °C tempera-
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where a 100-year period serves as an arbitrary, but intention-
ally long, time frame to ensure that the most important cost
impacts are captured7 and r is the discount rate. Implicit in
Eqs. (2) and (3) is the standard assumption made in the fields
of finance and microeconomics that an asset’s value equals the
present value of the benefit stream emanating from it over
time. QT is the total subsurface quantity of each resource
type—oil (O), natural gas (G), and coal (C)—that would be
extracted in year i in a world not constrained by climate policy.
The three PT terms are the market price in year i for oil, gas,
and coal in the unconstrained case.
The structure of Eq. (3) is similar to that of Eq. (2), except
that the three QB terms and the three PB terms are estimated
based on the impact of a strong climate policy regime.
Because we suppose a climate policy that reduces demand
for fossil fuels (rather than constraining supply), both prices
and quantities would be lower in Eq. (3) than they are in
Eq. (2). The three QT and QB terms are each further individu-
ally constrained such that the cumulative quantity over time
for each fuel type cannot exceed the total technically recover-
able subsurface resource (less a reserve for non-energy uses).
In short, the structure of Eq. (3) is the same as for Eq. (2),
except that the latter reflects the price and quantity effects of a
different policy regime.
4 Variation in production costs will also affect how the Carbon Ask gets
distributed across the fossil fuel supply chain. Lower production costs
mean that the Ask will be higher for asset owners (who take as profits
the difference between price and cost), while high production costs imply
that the firms and workers doing the production will experience a larger
share of the Carbon Ask. Variability in production costs does not, how-
ever, change the aggregate estimate of the Ask.
5 Geopolitical considerations, and attempts at market manipulation, may
impede a least-cost allocation of production by markets. Nonetheless,
production costs and carbon content would still play a role in the trajec-
tory of prices and quantities.
6 This approach is still incomplete because it does not capture the gains
experienced downstream by the purchasers of fossil fuels who extract
value in excess of the purchase price, a concept that economists refer to
as consumer surplus. Given available data, we are not able to easily
measure this downstream economic value.
7 At discount rates of 3.00 and 9.42%—the two rates used in this paper—
a cost of $1.00 incurred 100 years from now has, respectively, a present
value of about $0.05 and $0.0001. Costs incurred more than 100 years in
the future thus have a minimal impact on our results.
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Century-long forecasts are of course subject to substantial
uncertainties. The prices and quantities of fossil fuels used
annually between today and 2115 will surely differ from what
we have assumed in this analysis. Such differences do not,
however, undermine the validity of our result. Our intent is
not to omnisciently compute the Bright^ value of the Carbon
Ask which, with hindsight in 2115, will be seen as an accurate
match to historical reality.8 Because we are interested in to-
day’s political dynamic, we just have to be Bright^ about what
key players think the value of the Carbon Ask is today and
how pending climate policies will affect their economic well-
being. Like these stakeholders, we have no choice but to apply
reasonable assumptions to the available data in order to mea-
sure the Carbon Ask.
Calibrating the Carbon Ask
We first calibrate Carbon Ask against the value of each fossil
fuel type under the unconstrained, business-as-usual scenario,
Fx ¼ AxVBAUx ð4Þ
where Fx is the fraction of the asset value for resource type x
(oil, gas, or coal) lost to the Carbon Ask.We then calibrate the
Ask in economic terms,
IE ¼ AGDP ð5Þ
where IE is the economic impact of the Carbon Ask, A is
the Carbon Ask in monetary terms, and GDP is global
gross domestic product. Finally, we compute how much
of each resource is left unused during the 100-year an-
alytic period and express that quantity as the fraction of
the resource that would have been used over 100 years




UX ¼ IXX 100
i¼1QTXi
ð7Þ
where IX is the impact of the Carbon Ask for resource type x
(oil, gas, or coal) in natural units and UX is the fraction of the
resource that remains unproduced. The QTX and QBX terms
are as defined above.
Data
Estimated total resources
Our approach to estimating existing quantities of oil, natural
gas, and coal is described in the Technical Appendix. By way
of summary, we did not collect any original information but
relied primarily on data from government agencies such as the
US Geological Survey (USGS) and the German Federal
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR). We
included estimates of conventional resources and unconven-
tional resources (such as shale gas and tight oil) and estimates
of proved reserves and of technically recoverable resources.
Reserve estimates tend to be point estimates based on site-
specific analyses, while estimates of yet-undeveloped re-
sources tend to be the result of probabilistic modeling that
projects the likelihood of discovering fossil fuel resources in
locations around the world as a function of geological condi-
tions. When quantities have been estimated probabilistically,
we use the mean value from each distribution to estimate
resources in the analyzed location. In addition, some fossil
fuels support non-energy uses (e.g., as feedstocks in the chem-
ical industry), and we assume that 8.02, 1.71, and 0.02 % of,
respectively, oil, gas, and coal resources will go to such uses
(Heede and Oreskes 2016). Finally, it is also important to note
that credible global data on coal resources are far sparser than
for oil and gas; we had to make a number of simplifying
assumptions when deriving our estimates of coal resources.
For reasons outlined in the Technical Appendix, the estimates
shown in Table 1 are lower bound estimates, with actual Breal-
world^ quantities likely higher.
Fossil fuel price and quantity trajectories
Projections of fossil fuel prices and quantities reflect work
done by the IEA which uses its World Energy Model (de-
scribed in Box 1) to inform annual analyses of global energy
issues. Its 2015World Energy Outlook includes projections of
prices and quantities through 2040 under alternative policy
scenarios. IEA’s projections assume annual GDP growth of
3.5 % from 2013 to 2040 and annual population growth of
0.9 % (IEA 2015b, pp. 37, 40). The IEA model simulates the
impact of emerging energy technologies and Ba process of
technology learning^ but does not assume Btechnological
8 While 100 years of price and quantity data will be available in 2115,
there still would not be any historical data about a counterfactual world in
which an alternative policy regime had existed.
Table 1 Estimated global quantities of technically recoverable
resources available for energy use
Oil (billion barrels) Natural gas (trillion m3) Coal (billion t)
4436 465 8934
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breakthroughs which are as yet only aspirations^ (IEA 2015a,
pp. 43, 106).
Box 1
The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Model (WEM)
The model is a large-scale simulation tool [that] consists of three main
modules covering final energy consumption (including industry,
transport, buildings, agriculture, and non-energy use), fossil fuel and
bioenergy supply, and energy transformation (including power and
heat generation, oil refining, and other transformation). The primary
outputs from the model for each region are energy demand and supply
by fuel, investment needs, and CO2 emissions The WEM is a very
data-intensive model that covers the entire global energy system. The
current version models global energy demand on the basis of 25 dis-
tinct regions, 13 of which are individual countries. Global oil and gas
supply is modeled based on 120 distinct countries and regions; global
coal supply is modeled based on 31 countries and regions. Most of the
historic data on energy demand, supply, and transformation, as well as
on energy prices, are obtained from IEA databases of energy and
economic statistics. These are supplemented by additional data
from many external sources (IEA 2015b, pp. 32–33).
Of interest are two IEA scenarios: the Current Policies
Scenario (CPS), which reflects Bbusiness as usual^ and incor-
porates policies implemented as of mid-2015, and the 450
Scenario (450S), which assumes a set of policies that keep
greenhouse gas emissions to a level that yields a 50 % chance
of holding warming to the 2 °C goal (IEA 2015a, p. 106; IEA
2015b, p. 34). We take IEA’s CPS to be equivalent to our
business-as-usual (BAU) case and IEA’s 450S to be equiva-
lent to our 2 °C case.
The policy objective in IEA’s 450 Scenario is a demand-
driven reduction in fossil fuel use. IEA assumes that a high
CO2 price under 450S will stimulate substantial growth in
low-carbon electricity generation, much higher energy effi-
ciency, and significant electrification of the world’s passenger
vehicle fleet (IEA 2015a, p. 109).9 Fossil fuel subsidies are
phased out by 2040 everywhere except the Middle East (IEA
2015a, p. 33). The CO2 price in 2040 is $140 per ton in all
major economies, except China, Russia, Brazil, and South
Africa, where the price is $125. Under CPS, only the EU
and Korea are simulated to price carbon in 2040 (at $40)
and then only in certain sectors (IEA 2015b, p. 42).
To derive annual prices and quantities, we took several
steps. We used the IEA estimates for prices and quantities
for 2020, 2030, and 2040. For current production levels,
IEA’s estimates of gas and coal quantities are for 2013, while
data for oil are for 2014. To ensure temporal consistency, we
used the BP Statistical Review for 2014 quantity data for coal
and gas (BP 2015).We used IEA data for the 2014 price of gas
and coal, but owing to the steep decline in oil prices starting in
late 2014, we used updated data for current oil prices. We
took the average of European Brent spot oil prices from
January to October 2015 (EIA 2015b), deflated to 2014
dollars (Federal Reserve 2015). Finally, to facilitate projec-
tions beyond the end of IEA’s 2040 analytic end-date, we
computed the annual linear growth rate for prices and quan-
tities between 2030 and 2040. Our results are summarized in
Table 2.
Using the estimates from Table 2, we constructed annual
estimates of prices and quantities under both policy scenarios.
Linear interpolation was used for the years in the 2015 to
2020, 2020 to 2030, and 2030 to 2040 intervals. For years
after 2040, we applied the linear annual growth rate from
2030 to 2040. This simplification of a complex reality was
necessary because sophisticated simulations over longer time
frames are not available in the public domain. As explained
below, we conducted sensitivity analyses to assess how this
extrapolation of post-2040 quantities affected our results.
Prices are expressed in 2014 dollars. The 100-year analytic
time frame runs from 2016 to 2115.
Other data
To compute the present value of the stream of revenues from
fossil fuel production, we analyzed two discount rates. We
used 3.00 % as a risk-free discount rate that might be used
by a risk-neutral government policymaker investing on behalf
of a large number of taxpayers (U.S. Office of Management
and Budget 2003). The choice of a 9.42 % rate reflects the
weighted average cost of capital for five global industrial sec-
tors related to coal, oil, and gas. If each sector is weighted
based on the global number of firms in it, the overall cost of
capital is 9.42 % (Damodaran 2015).
To capture the different cost of capital for governments and
private firms, we applied the lower (3.00 %) rate to
government-owned fossil fuel resources and the higher
(9.42 %) rate to privately held assets. Data on ownership ap-
pear to exist only for proved reserves; we assume that the
ownership shares of non-reserve resources are the same as
for reserves. Based on Heede and Oreskes, we estimate that
91.3 % of oil resources, 91.0 % of gas resources, and 89.7 %
of coal resources are owned by governments (2016). We use
these percentages as weights to compute a weighted average
of the Carbon Ask under the two discount rates.10 To compute
Eq. (5), we used an exchange – rate–based global GDP of
$77.869 trillion in 2014 (World Bank 2015).
Table 3 summarizes our approach and contrasts it with the
analyses done by others described above.
9 By contrast, a supply-side policy mechanism would force resource
owners to curtail extraction. In the absence of price controls, a supply-
side policy would create artificial scarcity, increasing prices and creating
windfall profits for some owners. 10 The result is equivalent to applying a single discount rate of 3.18 %.
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Sensitivity analyses
In addition to our base case, we conducted five sensitivity
analyses to explore the importance of three elements of our
methodology. First, to understand the impact of linear extrap-
olation of prices and quantities (based on the period from 2030
to 2040) to project prices and quantities from 2041 to 2115,
we applied an exponential growth rate (again based on the
2030 to 2040 period) to simulate post-2040 values and, in
another sensitivity analysis, simulated no change in prices
and quantities in 2041 and beyond (i.e., these values are held
at their 2040 levels). Second, to understand the impact of
using a 100-year time frame for the analysis, we evaluated
both a 25-year and a 150-year time frame. Finally, to under-
stand the impact of our choice to measure the Carbon Ask
based on all resources (i.e., reserves plus non-reserve re-
sources), we conducted a sensitivity analysis in which produc-
tion is limited to proved reserves.
Results
Results of primary analysis
Table 4 indicates that, with blended public/private sector dis-
count rates, the value of subsurface fossil fuel resources in a
business-as-usual case is about $295 trillion. In a world
constrained by climate policy, the value of those resources
drops to about $110 trillion, a decrease of $185 trillion, or
63%. In dollar terms, the Ask is largest for oil ($127.5 trillion)
while, as a percentage reduction in current values, it is largest
for coal (75 %). As shown in Table 5, the total Ask is equiv-
alent to 2.38 years of global GDP, with most of the Ask orig-
inating in oil (1.64 years), with the remainder in gas and coal
(at 0.43 and 0.31 years, respectively). Table 6 demonstrates
that about 58, 3, and 82 % of, respectively, the oil, gas, and
coal resources that would otherwise have been produced over
the next 100 years would likely remain unburned under a 2 °C
climate policy.
Table 7 provides data about the year in which production is
simulated to come to an end, under both the BAU and 2 °C
cases. Use of oil, for example, ends in 2102 under the BAU
case because cumulative production reaches our estimate of
total subsurface resources while use ends in 2115 in the 2 °C
case because demand drops to zero.
Results of sensitivity analyses
Table 8 provides the results of the sensitivity analyses. The
exponential approach to estimating post-2040 prices and
quantities causes the Carbon Ask to increase from $185 tril-
lion to $203 trillion, while the fixed price assumption causes
the Ask to drop to $112 trillion. Although the difference
among these three cases is substantial, we believe that even
the lower value of $112 trillion is still so large that our core
conclusion remains valid. Truncating the analysis at 25 years
(which avoids the question of how to extrapolate IEA’s results
beyond its modeling period) causes the Carbon Ask to drop
dramatically, to $39 trillion. While this is an interesting result,
we do not attach much practical importance to it. In the ab-
sence of climate policy, fossil fuel production is almost certain
to continue for many decades, if not a century or more. Ending
the analysis in 2040 effectively assigns no value to fossil fuels
produced after that date, a result that is not realistic. When it
comes to the 150-year sensitivity case, the Ask increases from
$185 trillion to $189 trillion, but in comparative terms, this is a
small increase.
The final sensitivity explores the consequences of limiting
the analysis to only proved reserves. Given this assumption,
the world would run out of resources sooner. For example, in
the BAU scenario, oil production ends in 2051 (when proved
resources are simulated to be exhausted) rather than in 2102 as
in our base case. As described previously, however, we be-
lieve that it is a mistake to focus only on proved reserves
Table 2 Price (P) and quantity (Q) trajectories
Crude oil Natural gas Coal


























2014 33,611 $54 33,611 $54 3393 $9.10 3393 $9.10 5545 $78 5545 $78
2020 35,588 $83 34,201 $77 3914 $7.74 3770 $7.26 6040 $99 5360 $80
2030 39,165 $130 30,624 $97 4766 $11.13 3922 $8.89 7033 $115 4463 $79
2040 42,742 $150 27,047 $95 5617 $12.51 4073 $8.63 8026 $123 3565 $77
Yearly change
(2030–2040)
357.7 $2.00 −357.7 −$0.20 85.2 $0.14 15.2 −$0.03 99.3 $0.80 −89.8 −$0.20
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because substantial economic value is ultimately realized from
non-reserve resources as they become first proved reserves
and then produced resources. Even if one wishes to consider
only proved reserves, a Carbon Ask of $71 trillion—roughly
equivalent to a year of global GDP—is still an extraordinarily
large number.
Key limitations
Our results should be interpreted in light of several analytic
limitations. First, although the price and quantity trajectories
through 2040 come from IEA’s sophisticated modeling, post-
2040 quantities reflect simple linear extrapolation. While our
sensitivity analyses suggest that the extrapolation method
does have a material effect on our results, even the lowest
value for the Carbon Ask ($112 trillion) is still quite large.
What’s more, our objective is not to compute a value for the
Carbon Ask that will be proven historically correct in 2115;
instead, because we aim to explain today’s political dynamics,
we only need to make an estimate that can reasonably be said
to match the likely calculations of stakeholders potentially
affected by decarbonization of the world’s economy.
A second consideration is that we calculate the Carbon Ask
based on the single, demand-side, climate policy embedded in
the IEA 450 Scenario. This scenario represents an aggressive
approach to reduce demand for fossil fuels with substantial
technological innovation and imposition of a high price on
carbon. If policymakers enact more timid policies or if tech-
nological innovation proceeds more slowly, then more fossil
fuels will be used, and will likely command a higher price,
than would otherwise be the case. In turn, we will have over-
estimated the size of the Carbon Ask. On the other hand, IEA’s
450 Scenario is built on a carbon budget that reflects a 50 %
probability of staying within the 2 °C target. Many policy
debates, however, have focused on a 66 % chance of achiev-
ing the target which, in turn, corresponds to a 23 % smaller
carbon budget. If policymakers implement demand-side poli-
cies to stay within the smaller carbon budget, then the Carbon
Ask estimated here is too low. Finally, if policymakers imple-
ment supply-side measures (e.g., a prohibition or other con-
straint on fossil fuel production), price and quantity
Table 5 Carbon Ask relative to 2014 global GDP of $77.869 trillion
Discount rate Oil Gas Coal Total
3.00 % 1.77 0.47 0.34 2.58
Blended case 1.64 0.43 0.31 2.38
9.42 % 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.33
Table 4 The size of the Carbon
Ask Value of subsurface resource—BAU scenario (2014$ million)
Discount rate Oil Gas Coal Total
3.00 % $208,219,123 $75,026,297 $34,390,281 $317,635,700
Blended case $193,931,475 $69,849,510 $31,638,929 $295,419,914
9.42 % $43,993,288 $17,506,450 $7,678,122 $69,177,861
Value of subsurface resource—2 °C scenario (2014$ million)
Discount rate Oil Gas Coal Total
3.00 % $70,143,687 $38,380,194 $8,291,903 $116,815,783
Blended case $66,412,431 $36,011,069 $7,850,327 $110,273,827
9.42 % $27,255,687 $12,056,587 $4,004,758 $43,317,032
Carbon Ask (2014$ million)
Discount rate Oil Gas Coal Total
3.00 % $138,075,435 $36,646,103 $26,098,379 $200,819,917
Blended case $127,519,044 $33,838,441 $23,788,602 $185,146,087
9.42 % $16,737,601 $5,449,863 $3,673,364 $25,860,828
Carbon Ask as % of value in BAU scenario
Discount rate Oil Gas Coal Total
3.00 % 66 % 49 % 76 % 63 %
Blended case 66 % 48 % 75 % 63 %
9.42 % 38 % 31 % 48 % 37 %
Table 6 Calibrating the Carbon Ask




Oil 2.58 trillion barrels 58.2 %
Gas 12.82 trillion m3 2.8 %
Coal 871.27 billion t 81.6 %
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trajectories could be markedly different, as artificial scarcity
causes prices to rise, thereby creating windfalls for some pro-
ducers and effectively shutting down others. It is not, howev-
er, particularly important that we accurately forecast the tra-
jectory of climate policy over the next 100 years; instead, as
long as the IEA 450 Scenario captures reasonable expecta-
tions on the part of today’s stakeholders about the likely char-
acter of climate policy, then our results remain valid as means
of understanding today’s political dynamics.
Third, as explained in the Technical Appendix, our esti-
mate of the existing subsurface quantities of fossil fuels is
almost certainly an underestimate. Large portions of the globe
have not been assessed for the presence of unconventional
resources (such as tight oil and shale gas). To the extent that
such resources exist in large quantities, then a strong climate
policy would hinder their production, thereby increasing the
size of the Carbon Ask. In addition, we omitted methane hy-
drates from our analysis even though some experts believe
that there is much more natural gas in hydrates than in any
other type of resource (IEA 2013; Rogner 2012). We omit
methane hydrates because production has yet to be proven
commercially viable (Rogner 2012; Whitney et al. 2009)
and because credible data are sparse. If commercial produc-
tion of methane hydrates becomes feasible, however, then the
Carbon Ask could be appreciably higher than we have
estimated.
Discussion
The nature of the Carbon Ask
At $185 trillion, the Carbon Ask is a substantial sum by any
measure. It represents 2.4 times annual global GDP and a
63 % deterioration in the value of fossil fuel assets which, in
a world not constrained by climate policy, are worth $295
trillion. As with all long-term valuations, the discount rate
has a significant effect. At 3.00 %, the Carbon Ask tops
$200 trillion, while at 9.42 %, it falls to $26 trillion. Even this
lower value, however, represents a 37 % devaluation relative
to the unconstrained asset value.
Our results confirm that the Carbon Ask can manifest in
two different ways. The first is when resources are not pro-
duced, implying that the resource owner (and the firms and
workers in its supply chain) lose the value of the foregone
production. Even if some production occurs in a policy-
constrained world, adverse impacts still occur if the price is
less than it otherwise would have been. Both phenomena are
present in our results. For example, in the case where oil
production is not constrained by climate policy, about 4.4
trillion barrels are cumulatively produced at an average
(undiscounted) price of $192 per barrel during the 100-year
simulation period. In the 2 °C case, however, only 1.9 trillion
barrels are produced at average price of $85 per barrel.
In addition, our results suggest that the impact of the
Carbon Ask will be experienced differently across fuel types.
In proportional terms, coal experiences the most significant
effects, with 75 % of its economic value, and 82 % of its
physical mass, being lost to the Ask.While oil suffers a small-
er proportional deterioration in economic value (66 % versus
coal’s 75 %), it suffers a much larger impact in absolute terms
($128 trillion versus $24 trillion). This reflects the relative size
of the two industries; the value of oil revenues in the BAU
case ($194 trillion) is six times larger than the value for coal
($32 trillion). Interestingly, at the end of the 100-year model-
ing period, only 3 % of gas resources remain underground in
the 2 °C case relative to the BAU case, yet the reduction in
economic value for gas is 48 %. The reason for the discrep-
ancy l ies in pric ing. Gas commands an average
(undiscounted) price of $7.84 per million BTU in 2 °C case
but $13.74 in the BAU case.
Table 7 Final year of production/reason for end of production
Resource BAU 2 °C
Oil 2102/




Cumulative production reaches estimated quantity of subsurface resource
Not applicable—production continues beyond 2115
Coal Not applicable—production continues beyond 2115 2079/
Negligible demand



















Base 100 Linear Resource $185,146,087
Sensitivity 100 Exponential Resource $202,702,261






Sensitivity 150 Linear Resource $189,203,484
Sensitivity 100 Linear Reserve $71,205,314
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The role of technology incumbents
Given the size of the Carbon Ask and the historical evidence
on the politics of technological innovation, we would expect
technology incumbents to exert political pressure to impede
the transition to new technologies. Accordingly, we investi-
gated industry reaction to the recently promulgated US Clean
Power Plan (CPP) intended to reduce emissions from electric
power plants—the country’s single biggest source of CO2
(EPA 2016). In particular, the CPP requires states to reduce
emissions from coal- and gas-fired power plants (EPA 2015).
Implicit in the CPP is a hierarchy of preferred strategies: in-
creased energy efficiency, more renewable energy, and use of
gas in lieu of coal. Coal suffers under all three strategies, while
natural gas suffers under the first two, but benefits from the
third.
Because 67 % of US electricity is generated with fossil
fuels (EIA 2016), coal and natural gas are incumbent technol-
ogies. While non-hydropower renewable energy technologies
(e.g., solar and wind) are increasing in scale, they are respon-
sible for only 7 % of electricity generation (EIA 2016) and can
be viewed as technology innovations that challenge incum-
bent coal- and gas-powered generation.
Twenty-seven states have sued the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to block the rule’s implementation
(Environment & Energy Publishing 2016). Data are also avail-
able, by state, on the presence of in-state coal and gas reserves
(EIA 2015a; EIA 2014a). If the core premise of this paper—
that subsurface fossil fuel resources motivate efforts to impede
policy to address climate change—is correct, we would expect
to see a correlation between the presence of oil and gas re-
serves and a state’s decision to join the suit against EPA. As
Table 9 demonstrates, such a pattern is indeed evident. If a
state has coal reserves, it is more than twice as likely to have
sued EPA to block the Clean Power Plan as a state with no
coal reserves. A similar pattern holds for states with gas re-
serves. In both cases, the results are statistically significant at
the 0.01 level.
Especially interesting is that fossil fuel interests have not
limited their action to lobbying lawmakers and attempting to
influence public opinion about the CPP but also appear to
have activated the policy apparatus in these 27 states to take
legal action on their behalf. Even as a first approximation of
what is undoubtedly a complex phenomenon, this analysis
provides evidence that fossil fuel incumbents are unlikely to
surrender their markets without a fight.11 It also confirms that
political action is correlated with, if not motivated by, the
presence of fossil fuel resources (i.e., the focal point of the
Carbon Ask). Finally, resistance by industry incumbents to the
technological changes required by the CPP is consistent with
historical patterns described by Balalaeva, Comin and Hobijn,
and Mokyr.
Technology transformation: market- or policy-driven?
Especially over the past two centuries, technological innova-
tion has been a central feature in economic development, with
radical advances across sectors such as agriculture, transpor-
tation, chemicals, medicine, manufacturing, information tech-
nology, and telecommunications. At first glance, such exam-
plesmight be taken as evidence of the practicality of achieving
decarbonization of the world’s energy sector. In most cases,
however, these changes were not the intentional result of gov-
ernment policy but are examples of Schumpeter’s Bcreative
destruction^ in which a new technology with superior perfor-
mance and/or lower costs pushed aside an incumbent technol-
ogy or business practice and succeeded in the market because
it created superior value for its users.
We struggled to come up with historical examples of eco-
nomic transformations that were both at the same scale as
global decarbonization and the result of intentional govern-
ment action. While there has been substantial environmental
progress in the US and the EU when it comes to local air
quality and water pollution, such waste management activities
are not analogous to situations where governments intervene
in large existing markets to purposively alter the types of
goods being bought and sold in commercial transactions.
There are some relevant precedents—the phaseout of ozone
depleting substances and of certain pesticides such as DDT—
but such cases were much smaller in scale than
Table 9 States’ propensity to sue to block EPA’s Clean Power Plan as








Yes Number 22 11 33
Percent 66.7 % 33.3 % 100.0 %
No Number 5 13 18
Percent 27.8 % 72.2 % 100.0 %








Yes Number 14 3 17
Percent 82.4 % 17.6 % 100.0 %
No Number 13 21 34
Percent 38.2 % 61.8 % 100.0 %
t= 2.840; p= 0.01
11 Interestingly, parties suing EPA over the CPP include not only several
states but also multiple trade associations, coal companies, and at least
three labor unions. Without a more detailed analysis, it is not possible to
discern the degree to which specific components of the Carbon Ask, and
its economic impacts, have motivated the specific political actions of
these stakeholders.
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decarbonization would be (and depended on the availability of
cost-effective substitutes).
While government campaigns to reduce tobacco consump-
tion have enjoyed significant success, the US experiment with
alcohol prohibition in the early twentieth century is widely
regarded as a failed policy. One author—who treads lightly
because of the freighted human rights issues—notes that
decarbonization has economic parallels to the US abolition
of slavery, the foundation of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century southern agricultural economy and the primary driver
of the Civil War (Hayes 2014). While a more thorough histor-
ical analysis might yield other cases of policy-driven econom-
ic transformation, it seems important to appreciate the limited
precedents for such action, especially given the foundational
role that fossil fuel energy plays across the economy.
Compensating entities facing the Carbon Ask
Even if a sound climate policy passes a strict cost-benefit test
where benefits exceed costs, the distribution of the costs and
benefits of action will not align well across socioeconomic
groups, industry groups, poor and rich countries, or producers
and consumers. In short, there will be winners and losers, and
those on the receiving end of the Carbon Ask will be among
the losers. Because many of these actors are in a position to
thwart policy changes, one wonders if there is a way to com-
pensate them for their losses, so as to facilitate the process of
decarbonization.
Compensating fossil fuel owners would not be easy.
Granted, the standard microeconomic framework suggests
that because the benefit of climate policy likely exceeds its
cost, winners (i.e., those who escape the adverse conse-
quences of climate change) could theoretically fully compen-
sate losers (i.e., those who incur the costs of emission reduc-
tions). As a practical matter, however, such transfers are high-
ly problematic. In addition to representing a massive redistri-
bution of wealth on a global scale for which there are currently
no legal or institutional mechanisms, unless the compensation
scheme were universal, leakage could easily undermine its
environmental benefit. If only some resource owners limit
fossil fuel production, then production would likely migrate
to other unconstrained resource owners, thereby enriching
them at the expense of those owners who do limit production
and also undermining the environmental benefit. The perma-
nence of agreements to leave resources underground may also
be suspect. Even if a resource owner agrees to cease produc-
tion today, there may be little recourse if the owner later re-
neges on its commitment (especially if the resource owner is a
sovereign state).
While international compensation mechanisms may be im-
practical, subnational policies may hold more promise.
Transitional assistance to workers, communities, regions,
and possibly even firms, adversely affected by deep
reductions in fossil fuel production might serve two objec-
tives: improving the welfare of those entities experiencing
the Carbon Ask and potentially mitigating at least some of
political opposition to strong climate policy. Financing for
such transitional assistance could come from a price on car-
bon—either in the form of revenues generated by a carbon tax
or through the government sale of emission allowances under
a cap-and-trade program.
Conclusion
In a word, the Carbon Ask is enormous, and will be experienced
by all those engaged in the global fossil fuel enterprise: firms,
workers, consumers, communities, and governments. The his-
torical record suggests that such groups—whose livelihoods and
well-being depend on current technologies and ways of doing
business—can be expected to use political power and the
policymaking process to thwart the diffusion of new technolo-
gies that threaten their interests. A failure to recognize this reality
only impedes the search for the kinds of compromises that will
be needed to achieve meaningful action on climate change. We
are reminded of Upton Sinclair’s observation that Bit is difficult
to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends
upon his not understanding it^ (Sinclair 1935, p. 109).
Given the size of the Carbon Ask and the history of tech-
nological change over the past two centuries, achieving the G-
7’s goal of decarbonizing the world’s economy by 2100 seems
possible only if either or both of two phenomena come to pass.
First, sufficient technological innovation must occur so that
low-carbon or carbon-free technologies can prevail over in-
cumbent technologies in the marketplace by offering superior
performance or lower price. Consider how competitive forces
have triggered a spiral of innovation between the iPhone and
Android phones that has consigned simple, flip phones to a
tiny fraction of the market (at least in America). If clean tech-
nologies can similarly outcompete fossil-fuel technologies
based on price and/or quality, then powerful market forces
may negate the political power of industry incumbents over
the long run. And, of course, a price on carbon, and an end to
fossil-fuel subsidies, would help level the playing field.
An alternative—perhaps complementary—path forward
lies in the policy world rather than the market place. In the
same way that industry incumbents translate their economic
power into political power, we might expect that as new tech-
nologies enjoy more economic success, there would be a com-
mensurate increase in their political power (Meckling et al.
2015). Wind power, for example, has attracted at least some
political support from policymakers who dispute the risks of
global warming but embrace the economic benefits in their
home jurisdictions (The Economist 2013). Increased political
power for new technology providers, supplemented by the
political power of engaged citizens, environmental interest
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groups, and those who stand to benefit from transitional aid to
entities facing the Carbon Ask, could thus help mitigate the
power of fossil fuel interests, not in the marketplace but in the
halls of government.
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